Is there a way to reconcile the Protestant, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic traditions? To restore the rifts caused by Rationalism and arguments over authority? According to some Protestants today, there is a way: a ressourcement of the early Church’s Sacramental Ontology is said to be the answer to these divisive issues, the way to reunite the Church and restore the early church’s heavenly mindedness and mysticism. Sacramental Ontology presents a worldview that gives value to the natural world, grounds the eschatological expectation of believers, and provides a hermeneutical approach to Scripture based on a Platonic-Christian synthesis. Essential to SO is its claim to Early Church consensus and Platonic foundation. The claims of SO’s proponents open it to philosophical and historical critique. Did the Early Church really have a universal Sacramental Ontology? This paper will investigate the consistency of SO with the view of the greatest theologian of the early church, Augustine. Is SO consistent with Augustine’s Platonism and theology?
To answer this question, we must first define SO. With this understanding, we will then examine the philosophical foundation of its Platonic participation—primarily in interaction with Augustine, but also with recourse to other Platonists. Finally, we will probe the coherence of this Ontology with Augustine’s view of time.
Though SO is a catchword in at least one theological graduate school and the key theme of two books, it is not easy to arrive at a precise definition. A definition eluded at least two reviewers of Boersma’s Nouvelle Theologie and is not found on Google, or in various dictionaries of theology. An examination of SO will require a solid working definition; we will build this with recourse to various articles and books by Boersma.
SO is an ontology, an understanding of being, which is sacramental in nature. This “sacramental” nature has caused confusion among some, so it is worth exploring at length. A sacrament, according to Boersma, is something that both signifies and participates in the reality (res) which it signifies. Because the sacrament participates in another reality, it has a mysterious quality, somehow making present the mystery in which it participates. This ties the supernatural and the natural intimately together; no longer can they be divided, for the “natural” sacrament always mediates the mystery of the “supernatural” reality it signifies. This isn’t just a reinterpretation of the Church’s Sacraments, but a reinterpretation of all reality. A SO understands this entire world to participate sacramentally in heavenly realities.
SO, then, is an understanding of the nature of the things in this universe as sacraments that participate in and point to heavenly realities. What this definition lacks is an understanding of what it means for the signs to participate in heavenly realities; this is where the Platonic synthesis of the early Church is essential. The things of this world are understood to be particular examples of the universal realities that have a real existence. It is suggested that, on the grounds of a Platonic idea of participation, the particular things share in and mediate the unseen realities of the Forms. Now these forms do not exist in their own realm as in Classical Platonism, they exist in God. As such, they are said to participate in God.
With a Platonic worldview in place, a distinction is made between two types of participation. “Predicamental participation” sees the particular fully sharing in the universal; a particular cat, Fluffy, fully shares in the Universal of Catness. “Transcendental participation” sees the particular as somewhat sharing in the universal, but not perfectly exemplifying it. This can be seen by a contrast; someone may be convinced that Fluffy is in some way intelligent—that he participates in the Universal of Intelligence—but it is quite obvious that he is not intelligent to the same degree as I, a human, am intelligent, nor as God is intelligent. With this definition in place, we can now examine the coherence of these ideas with the thought of Augustine.
Essential to this understanding of reality is the idea of participation, but this concept is not clearly set out in any of Boersma’s books. Even when we receive a definition such as “Transcendental Participation,” we are still left with the vague “sharing in the universal.” What does it mean for a particular to share or participate in the universal, and is this concept compatible with Augustine’s Platonism? It seems, at least to this author, that participation could be understood in various ways, but we will consider the view that best supports Boersma’s claims about the implications of participation. The closest Boersma gets to explaining “participation” in SO is saying what it is not; the Fathers did not accept the explicitly pantheistic Neo-Platonic view of participation. This seems to produce more problems than it solves, for only Neo-Platonism actually explicated “participation.”
To be sure, Plato did use the word “participation,” but this was a hole in his system of thought. Clark points out that the connection between the particular and universal—“participation”—is an enigma. In a dialogue with Parmenides, Socrates suggests that a universal can participate in all its particulars in the same way that daylight is one, it is singular, yet it touches upon all men. Despite this claim, Socrates maintains that the ideas are not in us, nor possessed by us. Throughout the Phaedo, Plato refers to the necessity of a particular to participate in the universal—for something to be two it must “participate” in the form of Duality. Despite the clear need for “participation,” he does not define what it is. Flew follows Clark in describing the ambiguity of the idea of participation; “[Good], like any other Form, must somehow make and cause whatever has these attributes to have them.”
One of Neo-Platonism’s great contributions to Platonism was an answer to how the particulars participate in the universals. Plotinus held that the material world was the farthest emanation from the One, his highest reality. The One necessarily emanated the next level of being, Mind, which necessarily emanated Soul and the minds of the particular things in the material world. The Soul then emanated the material world. The objects in the world receive their nature as direct emanations of the perfect and eternal forms existing in Mind. So particulars participated via a direct and causal connection with the forms. As Boersma points out, the early Church rejected this view because of its explicit Pantheistic connotations: if the material world is an emanation of the One via the Mind, Forms, and Soul, then the created world is essentially an extension of the One.
If Christians could not, and cannot, accept the Neo-Platonic explanation of participation, what is left to fill the requirements of SO? When we turn to Augustine, SO’s position becomes even direr. In a system of true Platonic Realism, one may be able to fall back on Plato’s explanation of the forms somehow causing and making the particulars, or his various illustrations. In the Timaeus, Plato’s Craftsmen unites the eternal Matter and eternal Form, giving shape to the world. In his allegory of the cave, the light casts the shadow of the Forms onto the back wall of the cave. For Augustine, the Forms did not exist in their own realm, there was no eternal light source casting their shadow into the world, and there was no eternal Craftsman to unite Form and Matter. However much Augustine retained a Platonic worldview in his Christianity, he at least departed on these matters. His “Realism” may be better identified as a form of proto-Conceptualism. For Augustine, the forms did not exist in their own realm as eternal and perfect entities. They were eternal, but only in as much as they were eternally existing ideas in the mind of God. They did not eternally shine a shadow into this world, but God used these ideas to create our world out of nothing. He spoke matter into existence after the form of the Universals in His mind. This departure from Realism leaves even Plato’s weak analogies useless. If we cannot turn to Plotinus’ explanation of participation, then any participation spoken of in reference to a position like Augustine’s has to be that of a blueprint to the actual building; the actual building is not a perfect representation of the blueprint, but is clearly derived from it.
For SO to hold, there must be an understanding of participation in place that explains the mysterious connection between the “natural” and the “supernatural.” At least when we turn to Augustine, that understanding did not exist, and outside of Neo-Platonism, it does not exist. It is not only on this key matter of participation that SO proves incompatible with Augustine’s thought; his view of time likewise betrays a growing rift between history and the claims for SO.
According to Congar, whom Boersma cites approvingly, SO provides a unique and Christological perspective on time. The present “participates” sacramentally in both the past and the future. Because the past, present, and future exist in God’s Logos, they are interconnected. Time is not—as we consider it today—successive, distinct, and unrelated moments—excepting causality. Because past, present, and future coexist in the human mind and in God’s, they coincide. To support this very confusing perspective, Boersma quotes Augustine’ Confessions.
To this author, the whole concept seems confused. However accurate or inaccurate that appraisal may be, at the very least, “sacramental time” is not supported by Augustine. Augustine’s view bears superficial similarity, but nothing more. Augustine does say “It is now plain and clear that neither past nor future are existent” and that it is not proper to say that there are three times. However, he then goes on to explain what he means. There is the “present of things past, the present of things present, and the present of things future.” The past is present as memories, the present in intuition or experience, and the future in expectation. All that really exists is the present. All that can be measured is time that is passing by, for that is all that exists. The moment in which we dwell exists, but the past has passed into non-existence and the future has yet to exist. Augustine’s view appears to be that all time only exists in its passing into and out of existence with each passing moment. In as much as time has existence in the mind, it is in memories, expectation, and intuition.
After looking briefly at two aspects of Augustine’s thought, it should be clear that the claim for SO’s historical and philosophical strength fails—at least in the case of the Early Church’s greatest philosopher and theologian. If SO did not hold captive his thought, can we be certain that it was as prevalent as claimed in the thought of other Fathers? At the very least, the implications of this inconsistency between SO and Augustine’s thought are these: its claims to historical consensus cannot be taken at face value, and its claim for support in the Platonic-Synthesis of the early Church is at least incompatible with its most biblically faithful and thorough synthesis.
 Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2011), 3–5, 26–27, 40–41, 67, 123–124, 132, 141, 188–189; Hans Boersma, “Anchored in Christ,” The Christian Century, February 8, 2011, 27. As a Protestant who has summarized the work of the Catholic Nouvelle Theologians on Sacramental Ontology—both for a semi-popular and academic audience—and given it his stamp of approval, Hans Boersma will be the primary source of interaction for this paper.
 From now on, SO.
 Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 250; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 16, 20, 51, 130, 134, 185, ; Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12, 32.
 Ashley Cocksworth, “Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery.,” Expository Times 122, no. 3 (2010): 148; Peter M. Candler, “Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery.,” Journal of Theological Studies 62, no. 2 (2011): 816.
 Or “the nature of things”. John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, A Theology of lordship (Phillipsburg, N.J: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co, 1987), 401; Alasdair MacIntyre, “Ontology,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), 142.
 See Daniel J. Treier, “Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry-A Review Essay,” Christian Scholar’s Review 41, no. 1 (2011): 67–71. And Boersma’s response; Hans Boersma, “Dan Treier’s Sacramental Participation in Truth-A Response to His Review of Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry,” Christian Scholar’s Review 41, no. 1 (2011): 73–76.
 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 16, 289; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 23–24.
 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 16; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 22.
 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 5, 16, 32; Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” 264; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 57.
 Hans Boersma, “Analogy of Truth,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and P. D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 160; Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 17; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 24.
 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 80.
 Ibid., 24, 51, 80, 89,.
 Ibid., 185. Analogies adapted from Ibid.
 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 70.
 Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1957), 86. The ambivalent nature of “participation” caused it grief. Gilbert Ryle, “Plato,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), 322.
 Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy, 86.
 Ibid., 90.
Emphasis added, Antony Flew, Introduction to Western Philosophy (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 65. The references to Phaedo are cited in Ibid., 49, 58–59.
 Emanation can be an odd concept to wrap one’s mind around. An analogy that may explicate it goes something like this: when the sun projects a beam of light, both the light and the beam are one. Imagine this light passes through a screen and casts a figure upon a mirror. The screen is the form, the light is the One, the mirror is the darkness into which the material world is emanated; the material object is nothing more than a distant reflection of Form. It is still made from the light of the Sun, so it is light, what it is comes from the Form, but it is only a pale representation, a crude shadow cast on the mirror. The figure of a mirror can confuse one into thinking that there is an independent reality other than the One and its emanations, but that is the thought of Plato, not Plotinus. For Plotinus, the light of the sun projects into darkness (nothing at all) until it gets dimmer and fades. At that farthest point of dimness is the “material world,” nothing more than the last dim glimmer of the light before it disappears. Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy, 177–178; Ronald H Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions : An Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1999), 125, 128–129.
 Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy, 176; Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions, 83–84.
 Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions, 71–76.
 I use the term “proto-Conceptualism” because, in many ways, Augustine’s view anticipates later Conceptualism, but there are significant differences. The Ideas, because they exist in God’s mind eternally, are not merely fleeting and transitory. Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 123. Cf. Thomas Mautner, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, Rev. ed., Penguin reference (London ; New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 103; C. Stephen Evans, Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 26, 99; H. Gene Blocker, World Philosophy : An East-West Comparative Introduction to Philosophy (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999), 135; A. D. Woozley, “Universals,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), 194–195; Flew, Introduction to Western Philosophy, 446.
 Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan Pub. House, 1982), 81–82.
 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 33, 225; Boersma, “Anchored in Christ,” 27; Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 124–126.
 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 126. Citing Confessions xi.20.
 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine,, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 292–293.
 Ibid., 293.
 Ibid., 290; Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy, 236.
Augustine. The Confessions of St. Augustine,. Translated by John K. Ryan. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960.
Blocker, H. Gene. World Philosophy : An East-West Comparative Introduction to Philosophy. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999.
Boersma, Hans. “Analogy of Truth.” In Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, edited by Gabriel Flynn and P. D. Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
———. “Anchored in Christ.” The Christian Century, February 8, 2011.
———. “Dan Treier’s Sacramental Participation in Truth-A Response to His Review of Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry.” Christian Scholar’s Review 41, no. 1 (2011): 73–76.
———. Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry. Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2011.
———. Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
———. “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac.” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242–273.
Candler, Peter M. “Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery.” Journal of Theological Studies 62, no. 2 (2011): 814 – 817.
Clark, Gordon H. Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1957.
Cocksworth, Ashley. “Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery.” Expository Times 122, no. 3 (2010): 147 – 148.
Evans, C. Stephen. Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2002.
Flew, Antony. Introduction to Western Philosophy. London: Thames and Hudson, 1971.
Frame, John M. The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. A Theology of lordship. Phillipsburg, N.J: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co, 1987.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “Ontology.” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972.
Mautner, Thomas. The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. Rev. ed. Penguin reference. London ; New York: Penguin Books, 1997.
Nash, Ronald H. Life’s Ultimate Questions : An Introduction to Philosophy. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1999.
———. The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969.
———. The Word of God and the Mind of Man. Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan Pub. House, 1982.
Ryle, Gilbert. “Plato.” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972.
Treier, Daniel J. “Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry-A Review Essay.” Christian Scholar’s Review 41, no. 1 (2011): 67–71.
Woozley, A. D. “Universals.” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972.